It is often maintained in conversation and print alike that scientifi c induction, a method of arriving at scientifi c generalities which may eventually acquire the status of "natural laws", is completely distinct from the method of proof commonly used in mathematics known as "mathematical induction". We examine the literature to demonstrate this unfortunate lack of confl ation and explain the embarrassingly simple way in which the two methods ultimately converge.
mathematics involved in deducing generalities from observations, the less certain one can even be of what has already been found even in this limited sense. This explains, to a large extent, the hotly contested areas of science such as particle physics and cosmology, where diff erences of opinion are as sharp, perhaps, as in many of the traditionally "softer" disciplines where mathematics is often not of much assistance. This extended prolegomena explains, in large part, the resistance by almost everyone to see the obvious connection between what, on the one hand, is merely the best we can presently do to sort natural phenomena out and, on the other hand, an undisputed method of proof taught in secondary schools and beyond.
In 1908, Professor A. Voss of Munich produced a 98-page monograph on the nature of mathematics, reviewed in Cajori (1909) , the most extensive treatment of the development of mathematical induction I was able to locate. Cajori's reading of Voss is that " [o] n the authority of Moritz Cantor, Voss ascribes the introduction of the inference by mathematical induction to Pascal (before 1654) and its independent re-introduction to Jacob Bernoulli (1680)." Cajori goes on to write -and it is not clear 1 whether the sentence is also an ascription to Voss or not -"This important process is called by Max Simon the «Bernoullian» or the «Kästnerian» inference. Charles S. Peirce ascribes it to Fermat and calls it the «Fermatian» inference." (Cajori 1909, 407) Cajori continues his review of Voss (now speaking clearly in his own voice) by discounting any claim of Kästner, because he (and others who are not mentioned by name) wrote so much later -"the second half of the eighteenth century" (Cajori 1909, loc. cit.) He says likewise that priority cannot be given to Bernoulli, coming as he did after Pascal, of whom he writes, "This process [viz., the process described in Pascal's complete works, Vol. 3, p. 248, published in 1866 in Paris] is precisely what is now designated by mathematical induction." [italics added] (Cajori, 1909, loc. cit.) . While he does concede that Fermat came fi rst -as early, says Cajori, as 1636 or 1637 -he denies him the status of discoverer for four reasons. The fi rst is that "it is not mathematical induction in its purity." (Cajori, 1909, 408) To me, this hardly matt ers ; no idea springs forth from anywhere in its "purity". This is not how either science or mathematics, or for that matt er any other discipline, develops. In this regard, I quote Ernest (1982, 120) : "Like many of the concepts of mathematics, proof by mathematical induction is not the invention [I would say "discovery"] of a particular individual at a fi xed date. Rather, the method is implicit in the work of mathematicians and slowly emerges until at last a satisfactory, fully explicit formulation is given." Second, and more compelling, the selfsame impure method was used by Campanus in 1260 "in his edition of 1 The reason it is not clear who is speaking is that the subsequent claims are footnoted, and whether the references were taken from Voss or are, in fact, due to Cajori, himself an expert on the subject, is unclear.
Euclid". (Cajori, 1909, loc. cit.) Ernest (1982, loc. cit (Cajori, 1909, loc. cit.) Diff erent people infl uence a discipline in diff erent ways, and to apply today's publication standards to a fi gure who lived so many centuries ago and on that account deny him any part of the credit due him is at least ahistorical and perhaps simply absurd.
2 The fourth reason is by far more compelling -and reminiscent of the later observation of Ernest previously quoted -viz., that "[t] he recurrent modes of inference of the Hindus and the Greeks are more nearly the modern process of mathematical induction than is the mode of inference used by Fermat," although also not "free from entanglement with other processes." (both from Cajori 1909, 409) . To this eff ect, he cites work from Bhaskara, Theon of Symrna, and Proclus, by name. His conclusion is that the modern method ought to be ascribed as originated by Pascal.
Shortly after publication of his review, he was contacted by Dr. G. Vacca, who had also worked on the history of this method of proof, whose work shows that it was discovered earlier by the Italian, Franciscus Maurolycus (1494-1575 C.E.). Vacca, and probably Cajori, fi nd it strange that Pascal could be unacquainted with Maurolycus' method and made no mention of it in his works. Regardless, we now know that the modern method in its purity ought to be att ributed to Maurolycus sometime in the sixteenth century. (Vacca, with an introductory note (and perhaps editing ; again this cannot be told) by Cajori, 1909 : 70-73) .
3 Incidentally, the modern method has two variants, known as "weak" and "strong" mathematical induction (Ernest, 1982 : 123-124) , and it is rather easy to prove that the "stronger" method is not really stronger (although it appears that way at fi rst blush), but is rather logi-2 See the following note regarding Pascal's use of a pseudonym as some support for this. Moreover, the claim is incorrect, although this is no fault of either Vacca or Cajori. Bussey (1917, 203) informs us that Pascal expressly att ributes the method to Maurolycus ; however, he does so in a lett er writt en under a pseudonym. Regardless, the point made above that applying today's publication standards to centuries ago is at least ahistorical and perhaps absurd stands. Cantor, too, from whom Cajori obtained his information, corrected his claim that Pascal originated the method in favor of Maurolycus, also subsequent to a communication from Vacca. (Bussey, 1917, 200) . cally equivalent to the "weaker" method. 4 These can be further generalized into the "well-ordering principle" as discussed in Ernest (1982, 124) ; there are also further induction principles such as the principle of "transfi nite induction", but these do not concern us here. Cajori (1918) writes that "no one, to [his] knowledge has before this time traced historically the origin of the name 'mathematical induction'." It seems clear from this source and others that the earliest occurrence of the name "mathematical induction" is due to the famous logician Augustus De Morgan in an article in the Penny Cyclopedia published in London in 1838. Cajori (1918) goes on at length contrasting scientifi c induction and mathematical induction, the former as a method of discovery and the latt er as a method of proof. This contrast is clearer is other sources, which we now cite. Bussey (1917) writes, "One method of clinching an argument by ordinary induction is what has been called mathematical induction." He goes on to add, incorrectly as we will show at this article's close, "It [meaning mathematical induction] is not a method of discovery but a method of proving what has already been discovered." [emphasis added]. In between these two sentences, he adds the crucial sentence, "A more signifi cant name and one that is being used more and more is complete induction." 5 Young (1908, 145) writes "He [meaning the pupil] will frequently fi nd that the course of development is from the particular to the general, and in such cases he will often fi nd em-4 Cohen (1991, 315) claims that this is not so easy to prove and is a source of "scepticism, confusion, or both", and so devises multiple conditionals and a new logic to simplify matt ers ! However, this hardly simplifi es matt ers ; it adds layers of unnecessary complexity. Cohen points to four sources (he lists three, but his second bundles two concerns together) for the scepticism and confusion, the "most serious" of which is "the 'negative paradox' property of the horseshoe of material implication (that a false antecedent makes the entirety 'vacuously' true) ... in order to circumvent the need for a base case." (Cohen 1991, 316) . But there is no good reason to formulate "strong induction" without a base case at all. (And, moreover, the negative paradox referred to is paradoxical only at fi rst glance -to develop a new logic and three separate implicative connectives in the formulation of, and in order to formulate, a single schema is surely overkill.) Ernest (1982) also presents "strong induction" without an explicit base case, but notes on p. 124 that "[t]he fact that P(1) must hold is concealed in the statement 'P(i) for I < 1 imply P(1)'." Most textbooks, however, not writt en for those specializing in mathematics do include an explicit base case. This rids the equivalent methods of "weak induction" and "strong induction" for any need for reliance on vacuous truth, even if one does regard that as paradoxical. In fairness to Cohen, none of the implicative connectives or the logic devised using them originate with him or were originally devised for this purpose ; that is merely his purpose for the lot of them in this article.
II. THE NAME "INDUCTION" AND THE CONTRAST SEEN
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The name "complete induction" comes from the German, and is by no means unique in the writing of Bussey ; it is his placement of that sentence between the other two that I fi nd telling, but not as telling as some other sources soon to be quoted. Likewise the name "incomplete induction" is treated at length by Cajori (1918) , but the contrast followed by what we term an unfortunate lack of confl ation and ultimately convergence is clearer elsewhere, as we will explain. ployed a method of reasoning called mathematical induction, which shares with non-mathematical induction the peculiarity of generalizing from particular instances, but which nevertheless, like other mathematics, produces that unhesitating confi dence that absolute accuracy of the result which is not felt as to the results of non-mathematical reasoning."
III. THE LACK OF CONFLATION OR THE MISSING LINK
Carl Boyer, the eminent historian of mathematics, writes in his History, "In fact, mathematical induction, or reasoning by recurrence [the name Pascal used], sometimes is referred to as 'Fermatian induction', to distinguish it from scientifi c or 'Baconian' induction" (388) . This is the common view and the received view. But he adds, in parentheses, on the same page, "(Today the former is sometimes known as "complete induction", the latt er as "incomplete induction".)" The matt er comes to a head in the work of Cohen and Nagel (1934, 147) who write that, "The reader has doubtless been ensnared by a word. There is indeed a method of mathematical induction, but the name is unfortunate, since it suggests some kinship with the methods of experimentation and verifi cation of hypotheses employed in the natural sciences. But there is no such kinship and mathematical induction is a purely demonstrative method." Cajori (1918, 200) tells us that mathematical induction was given the name "demonstrative induction" by George Peacock, but that it "has become obsolete".
The clincher comes in the same work, where Cohen and Nagel (1934, 275) write :
"Thus it is clear that we must get to know the primary premises by induction ; for the method by which even sense-perception implants the universal is inductive." [This he gets from Aristotle.] "This process is an important stage in our gett ing knowledge. Induction, so understood, has been called by W. E. Johnson intuitive induction. Nevertheless, this process cannot be called an inference by any stretch of the term. It is not a type of argument analyzable into a premise and conclusion. It is a perception of relations and not subject to any rules of validity, and represents the gropings and tentative guessings [today one would probably say 'conjectures'] of a mind aiming at knowledge." A few sentences later they write, "Aristotle, and others after him, have employed 'induction' in another sense. Suppose we wish to establish that Induction, in this sense, means establishing a universal proposition by exhaustive enumeration of all the instances which are subsumable under it. It has been called perfect or complete induction. Perfect induction is not antithetical to deduction. As we have just seen, perfect induction is an example of a deductive argument. .... It is evident that a perfect induction is possible only when all the instances of the universal proposition are already known to conform to it. But if general propositions could be employed only if they were the conclusions of a perfect induction, they would be utt erly worthless for inferring anything about unexamined instances. Now, while none of this is outright incorrect, it all seems to miss the point. Scientifi c induction is, indeed, a method of conjecture, as much so in mathematics as in the empirical sciences. Nothing is proven by examining less than the totality of instances. But the oft-used (at least formerly) names "incomplete" and "complete" induction indicate full well the unacknowledged, but almost obvious connection between the two methods, by which I do not mean that conjectures arrived at by scientifi c induction can then be proven (if true) by mathematical induction (at times). (This has been observed repeatedly and is by no means a new observation.) I rather mean that the latt er method is the completion of the former method and contrary to Cohen and Nagel is not at all sterile, in the case of infi nite sets, where, of course, direct exhaustive examination or enumeration (Baconian induction is also called "enumerative induction") is completely impossible. Indeed, Cohen and Nagel's complaint is reminiscent of the complaint about deduction more generally. If the conclusion is already implicit in the premises, what can possibly be gained by what is simply a mere exercise ? Well, it may be an exercise, but as human beings are not "logically omniscient" (the phrase is due to Hintikka), that is that they are not by any means aware of all the logical consequences of their beliefs, mathematics is a highly creative discipline, because fi guring out just how something follows from something in which it is admitt edly implicit is very often no easy matt er. This is perhaps why Poincairé called mathematical induction (then termed reasoning by recurrence) "mathematical reasoning par excellence". (Bell 1920 , 414) Young (1908 tells us expressly that Poincairé claimed of mathematical knowledge that "mathematical induction ... alone can teach us anything new".
In summary, the most common method of exhaustive enumeration for infi nite sets is the completion of the very method by which conjectures about such sets are arrived at as is indicated by their early names. The two methods are, of course, diff erent, but far from being unrelated or only marginally related, they converge in a particular and fruitful way and while they ought not to be confused, there is an element of confl ation present in the two methods, which has somehow gone unnoticed. The purpose of this article is to bring this connection to the fore.
